Washington’s effort to bolster the fledgling Greek government was its first experience with counterinsurgency after World War II. An American decision to back Athens came in 1947 at a time when the overarching strategic framework for countering communism, “containment,” was still in its embryonic stage. Greece was one of the first “pawns” in the expanding Cold War chessboard. The country had suffered horribly during the Nazi occupation, with roughly 8 percent of its population killed, 6 percent made homeless, and much of the rest of the nation devastated by catastrophic crop and infrastructure losses. During the war, the anti-Nazi Greek communists represented some of the most dogged and successful partisans, rejecting cooperation with the Axis occupation and resorting to guerrilla warfare in Greece’s formidable mountain ranges. The National Liberation Front (EAM) was one of the largest anti-Nazi groups, even if it was not entirely communist. Backed by the British, by late 1944 around 1.5 million of Greece’s 7.5 million inhabitants were somehow affiliated with the EAM.

Following Greece’s liberation in October 1944, the EAM found itself controlling most of the country; however, it soon began to clash with the British as well as the British-sponsored, royalist former Greek government, which had been exiled to Cairo. Almost overnight, these elements decimated the EAM. Even so, the group remained a viable political entity, one that was eager to assume power in postoccupation Greece. But given the fissures among the various Greek groups during the Nazi years, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the ensuing political activity would be far from harmonious.