The objective of this chapter needs clarification. Prima vista, the title promises information on what extent military expenditures contributed to the financial imbalances that have been a dominant feature of international relations between major countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the 1950s and early 1960s. A correlation between these two phenomena may, on the one hand, be obvious, but is, on the other hand, difficult to quantify without further detailed research. Taking this problem into consideration, the scope of this essay is more modest, and at the same time, more ambitious. Without neglecting the military origins of these financial problems, I am going to explain how monetary pressure on international relations, stemming from the burden of security, had far reaching and unintended consequences on international politics in general and on the process of economic integration in Western Europe in particular. The decision on the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in autumn 1956 and the signing of the Treaties of Rome in March 1957 cannot be understood properly without taking into consideration that there had been a hidden agenda within international security policy. Paradoxically, it is for the same reason that after 1958 it was not the Franco-German alliance that provided for the basic elements of a European security system, but still the Americans, who succeeded in making West Germany their closest and most dependent partner in Europe. In both cases, international financial relations played a crucial role in triggering far-reaching political decisions.