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11 - Congress, Lobbyists, and Interest Groups

Steven S. Smith
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Jason M. Roberts
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Ryan J. Vander Wielen
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
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Summary

The first amendment to the constitution provides that Congress may make no law abridging the right of the people to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Court rulings interpret the amendment broadly to include organized and paid representatives of the people, therefore limiting Congress's ability to regulate lobbying. In practice, interest groups and their lobbyists are a very important means by which the public conveys their expectations and demands to Congress. Nevertheless, Americans believe that members of Congress are beholden to special interests and lobbyists. A 2009 survey conducted by the Center on Congress at Indiana University found that 60 percent of Americans believe that Congress neither listens nor cares about what ordinary citizens think; more than 73 percent of those surveyed gave Congress a D or F on its ability to control the influence of special interests. In fact, when asked what they thought was the main influence on members of Congress, respondents were approximately three times more likely to answer special interests than constituents. A 2010 CBS/New York Times survey found that 80 percent of Americans agreed that most members of Congress are more interested in serving special interest groups than the people they represent.

These contrasting views – that lobbyists are essential to democracy and yet reviled by the public – give interest groups and lobbyists an uneasy place in congressional politics. In Chapter 1, we noted that representation of organized interests is a rapidly growing industry in Washington. In this chapter, we reemphasize this theme, discuss the evolving strategies of interest groups, and review the limited efforts of Congress to regulate lobbying. Congress, in accordance with the Constitution, has been able to put in place only minimal regulations on lobbying. As an alternative, Congress has placed more severe restrictions on legislators, as it is allowed to do, with respect to their relations with organized interests. Restrictions on campaign contributions from organized interests were detailed in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we concentrate on developments in the legislative strategies of groups and lobbyists.

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The American Congress , pp. 349 - 378
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

Schlozman, Kay Lehman Tierney, John T. Organized Interests and American Democracy New York Harper & Row 1986 74 Google Scholar
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Tierney, John T. Schlozman, Kay Lehman Congress and Organized Interests Congressional Politics Deering, Christopher J. Chicago Dorsey Press 1989 212 Google Scholar
Salisbury, Robert H. Putting Interests Back into Interest Groups Interest Group Politics Cigler, Allan J. Loomis, Burdett A. Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly Press 1991 382 Google Scholar

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