Were we humans not reflexive beings there could be no such thing as society. This is because any form of social interaction, from the dyad to the global system, requires that subjects know themselves to be themselves. Otherwise they could not acknowledge that their words were their own nor that their intentions, undertakings and reactions belonged to themselves. Without this, no two-person interaction could begin, let alone become a stable relationship. Similarly, not one social obligation, expectation or norm could be owned by a single ‘member’ of society. This would then make the very term ‘social agent’ meaningless.

This basic statement scarcely figures in introductory textbooks and many elaborate social theories have been presented without any reference to human reflexivity. Why? Reflexivity tends so to be taken for granted that its implications are rarely reflected upon themselves. The ability to know ourselves to be ourselves is simply presumed whenever reference is made to social agents, just as it is pre-supposed that these agents are also embodied, intelligent and open to social influences. It is as if these predicates were background assumptions, devoid of any further interest. However, we know from disputes at the beginning of the twentieth century that the issue of human intelligence was highly controversial and we know from those at the end of the century that human embodiment became problematic. In both cases, our understanding increased once we ceased taking them for granted. Perhaps the time has come for reflexivity to be moved under the spot-light.