To this point, our discussions have dealt with operational and symbolic ideology as aggregate concepts: how the electorate as a whole thinks of itself in ideological terms and the views that the electorate as a whole holds with respect to important issues of public policy. These analyses have provided a look into the fundamental character of mass preferences in the United States.

At the very least, these analyses should be able to provide leverage on one of the most fundamental questions of American public opinion: On balance, what do citizens want from their government? Do citizens prefer a “liberal” government, one that is active in redistributing wealth, regulating the economy, and distributing social benefits to citizens? Do they prefer a “conservative” government, one that gives primacy to the value of markets and individual choice and keeps taxes and social benefits correspondingly low? Or does the government that citizens want vary as a function of the political context, with demands for a more “liberal” government when conditions warrant a strong collective response to important social problems and a “conservative” one when they do not?

Our analyses of symbolic and operational ideology each provide clear answers to this question. The problem, of course, is that the answers conflict. Figure 5.1 illustrates the point. This figure simply incorporates the measures of operational and symbolic ideology for the years for which we have data for both.