In November 1993, President Bill Clinton charged into Seattle like a hungry hunter who could smell his prey. As the host of the annual conference of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a loosely organized forum representing 18 nations, he viewed this meeting – and APEC in general – as an unparalleled opportunity to plant the United States more deeply, more securely into the world's most economically fertile region.

No one can blame him for having such high expectations. The Asia-Pacific economy, including Japan, is growing so rapidly that, according to one estimate, it will be 15 percent larger than the American economy by the turn of the century. Even such an optimistic forecast may prove to be an underestimate if the NICs and ASEAN-4 keep expanding as rapidly as they have over the past decade, and China continues to maintain its surprisingly high rate of economic growth. Toss in Vietnam and Laos, which are just beginning to open and build up their economies, and the region's future appears even more promising. One would have to be a fool to sit out this dance.

At the same time, though, one would have to be a fool to think APEC is America's ticket to the ball. The economies of Asia are indeed becoming increasingly intertwined. But the thread that is sewing them together is not APEC, nor any other formal body or treaty. It is, to a large extent, Japanese developmentalism.