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2 - Do Religions Claim Truth?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Roger Trigg
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Summary

PLURALISM AND RELATIVISM

Religions that only express the personal attitudes of the believer cannot claim any truth that can be rationally assessed. Faith then is merely an idiosyncrasy that some have and some do not. As we have seen, however, this approach leaves unexplored the important issue of what faith is directed at. Is it the world, or reality? This question raises issues about truth, and if that becomes the monopoly of empirical science, religion is again pushed aside.

The fact that we can talk of different religions suggests that the notion of religious faith as a totally individual matter is misplaced. Faith is typically a body of belief and practice that is shared. The nature of truth is that it has to be communicated and learned. If truth is totally subjective, this means there can be no constraint on what I believe. I do not have to communicate my beliefs to others or learn from others, and my beliefs do not have to be measured in some way against the hard facts of reality. I can believe whatever I like, but that means that belief is pointless. The very idea of belief is intimately connected with holding something true, and if I realize it is only true for me, there might seem little point in believing that or anything else.

Type
Chapter
Information
Religious Diversity
Philosophical and Political Dimensions
, pp. 23 - 41
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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