HOW much progress have we made in addressing the fundamental question of the social contract: “How can you get from the noncooperative hare hunting equilibrium to the cooperative stag hunting equilibrium?” The outlines of a general answer have begun to emerge. Over time there is some low level of experimentation with stag hunting. Eventually a small group of stag hunters comes to interact largely or exclusively with each other. This can come to pass through pure chance and the passage of time in a situation of interaction with neighbors. Or it can happen more rapidly when stag hunters find each other by means of fast interaction dynamics. The small group of stag hunters prospers and can spread by reproduction or imitation. This process is facilitated if reproduction or imitation neighborhoods are larger than interaction neighborhoods. As a local culture of stag hunting spreads, it can even maintain viability in the unfavorable environment of a large, random-mixing population by the device of signaling.