Responsibility for the content of foreign policy is almost invariably ascribed – by the public, by the media, by other states, and by historians – to members of the executive: elected members of Parliament given foreign policy roles in the government in power. So, for example, the “turn to America” during the Second World War is attributed to Prime Minister John Curtin, the signing of the Australian–Japanese trade agreement to Trade Minister John McEwen, the Cambodia Peace Settlement to Foreign Minister Gareth Evans – not to the other members of the foreign policy bureaucracy or the diplomatic or intelligence personnel who were undoubtedly involved in these policies. A statement made by a Prime Minister, a Foreign Minister, or a Trade Minister becomes policy as soon as it is uttered. It remains policy until it is retracted or overtaken by events. When a policy misstep occurs, ministers are blamed; when a success is registered, credit and kudos accrue primarily to them.

Members of the executive preside over the foreign policy machinery because they are ultimately accountable to the electors for the conduct of foreign policy. This is the reason that theirs is the final, authoritative decision on policy questions and that all other parts of the foreign policy machinery work to support them.

This chapter examines the particular type of involvement and influence of different members of the executive on the foreign policy process.