The story of the German economy between 1929 and 1938 is a critical one in the history of modern Germany. Historians and economists still debate the issues of the depression in the hope of showing that different economic policies might have stopped Hitler. The economic recovery that followed raised then, and since, important questions about the relationship between state and economy, questions that have come more clearly into focus with renewed emphasis in recent years on markets rather than state initiative in the developed economies. More controversially, the economic recovery stands at the centre of any ‘positive’ view of the Third Reich. If there is still disagreement about how the Nazi economy should be interpreted, there is a general consensus that recovery did occur at a faster rate and to a higher level than almost anywhere else in Europe. Since a central feature of the revival was the regime's willingness to undertake schemes of deficit financing, the myth has taken root that Hitler was a Keynesian before Keynes, and being so won widespread support inside Germany in the years of peace and returning prosperity.

While there is some truth in this picture, it is in general misleading. The economic recovery must be placed in a wider perspective. Indeed the very term ‘recovery’ is in some sense ambiguous. The German economy was relatively stagnant in the inter-war years.