We have seen that metaphysical constraints on properties that can be causally explanatory lead to grief for many kinds of nonpsychological explanations that are routinely and successfully accepted as causal explanations. This result suggests – rightly, in my opinion – that the Standard View conception of causal explanation is too restrictive. In response, I propose a test for a certain common and important kind of causal explanation. After defending the test against objections, I argue for the autonomy of intentional explanations, and then use the resulting thesis – that intentional explanations are not replaceable by physical explanations of the constituents of the intentional phenomena – to undermine the motivation for the Standard View of causal explanation. I argue that it is not in virtue of being brain states that beliefs are causally explanatory – even if they were brain states. Finally, I argue that the Standard View does not show how beliefs can be causally explanatory in any case. In the next chapter, I propose an alternative to the Standard View.

A TEST FOR EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY

A great deal rides on our finding causal explanations of such intentional phenomena as the defection of the working class from the Democratic party, Ross Perot's appeal, child abuse, the growth of the deficit. Hence it seems methodologically misguided to begin with a Standard View metaphysics that precludes the causal explanations we want, need, and are willing to pay millions to find.