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9 - Paternalism, self-paternalism, and the state

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Geoffrey Brennan
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
Loren Lomasky
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University, Ohio
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Summary

We cannot accept want-satisfaction as a final criterion of value because we do not in fact ourselves regard our wants as final; instead of resting in the view that there is no disputing about tastes, we dispute about them more than anything else; our most difficult problem in valuation is the evaluation of our wants themselves and our most troublesome want is the desire for wants of the “right” kind.

Frank Knight, “The Ethics of Competition”

Merit goods

Some goods are underproduced and underconsumed. Least controversially, the class of such goods will include Samuelsonian public goods of varying degrees of purity (i.e., goods that exhibit significant nonappropriability and/or joint consumption characteristics). Unless market provision of such goods is supplemented by nonmarket provision of an appropriate kind, a Pareto-inferior output will result. More controversial is the existence of merit goods, items underconsumed even in ideal markets. Among the goods for which such status has been claimed are the fine arts, attendance at economics lectures, and nutritious cholesterol-free diets. And as well, there can be demerit goods – those that are overconsumed at market prices. A representative listing of contenders for this status would include heroin, cigarettes, gambling, whiskey, and perhaps rock music. While the concept of a public good can be presented in terms that may appear to be value free, it is apparent that the concept of a merit good is fundamentally and ineliminably normative.

Type
Chapter
Information
Democracy and Decision
The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference
, pp. 143 - 166
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

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