Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- PART 1 DEFINING THE FIELD, ITS THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR
- PART 2 RESEARCH ON NEW CHALLENGES, METHODS, AND THREATS
- 6 On Counterterrorism and Intelligence
- 7 Technical Collection in the Post–September 11 World
- PART 3 INTELLIGENCE, POLITICS, AND OVERSIGHT
- Index
- References
7 - Technical Collection in the Post–September 11 World
from PART 2 - RESEARCH ON NEW CHALLENGES, METHODS, AND THREATS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- PART 1 DEFINING THE FIELD, ITS THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR
- PART 2 RESEARCH ON NEW CHALLENGES, METHODS, AND THREATS
- 6 On Counterterrorism and Intelligence
- 7 Technical Collection in the Post–September 11 World
- PART 3 INTELLIGENCE, POLITICS, AND OVERSIGHT
- Index
- References
Summary
A quarter-century ago, Wilhelm Agrell reflected on the impact of technical collection – which initially consisted of overhead photographic reconnaissance and communications intelligence (COMINT) – on national intelligence. On the positive side, it made it possible for the most advanced countries to get “an almost complete picture of the strength, deployment, and activity of foreign military forces.” The negative, for Agrell, was an overemphasis on what could be counted. Intelligence became “concentrated on evaluation and comparison of military strength based exclusively on numerical factors.”
Yet, since the fall of communism and since 11 September 2001, research has not really asked similar questions about the impact of technical collection. To be sure, the highly classified nature of some collection makes it difficult for outsiders to judge the effects on policy outcomes. It is possible, however, to come to the kind of judgments Agrell rendered about the impact of technical collection on the practice of intelligence. So far, however, more serious research has not moved much beyond the post–September 11 conventional wisdom that the change in intelligence's target renders technical collection less effective. Terrorists, it is thought, are small and fleet – networked enough not to depend on large fixed facilities that can be monitored from space and nimble enough to shift to forms of communication, such as couriers, that cannot be intercepted by satellite systems.
This chapter assesses research on technical collection, looking across the various “INTs” and, in particular, probing that conventional wisdom.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- National Intelligence SystemsCurrent Research and Future Prospects, pp. 147 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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