There appear to have been two virtually separate histories of the new submarine project running in parallel during the mid-1980s. On the one hand there was the campaign around Australia led by Hans Ohff, John White, Graham White and Jim Duncan that put forward the submarine project as a major catalyst for industrial regeneration. On the other there were the bureaucratic processes of defence procurement among a small circle within the Department of Defence and the navy, with political involvement in the critical decisions. Within the defence bureaucracy there was great uncertainty about the submariners' requirements and the proposed purchasing strategy and little enthusiasm for building in Australia.

It was not until December 1982 that the procurement method was endorsed by the defence source definition committee, allowing the release of formal proposals to industry. However, the force structure committee, which assessed budgetary allocations, imposed strong caveats on the project. It insisted on continued investigation of the suitability of smaller submarines, and of postponing the project if the Oberons' service could be extended. Further, Alan Wrigley, the committee's chairman, insisted that Australian industry involvement should be limited. Wrigley considered that building an industry around the project unnecessarily complicated the selection processes for no good reason. He was sure that a submarine industry could not be sustained because the type of submarine the navy wanted was too big to interest foreign navies. Wrigley energetically pushed this view in the last months of the Fraser government, but the change of government in March 1983 meant that he was swimming against a fast-flowing tide.