On June 16 and 17, 25 million Egyptians – half the electorate – selected the country’s first president since a popular uprising deposed Hosni Mubarak. On the top of the ballot was Ahmed Shafiq, a retired air force general who had served as Mubarak’s last prime minister and had edged out two major revolutionary candidates in initial voting on May 23 and 24. Next came Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood and head of its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Morsi had topped the field in May, and his candidacy in the runoff offered Egyptians an unprecedented chance to choose a civilian leader from the opposition. With 51.7 percent of the vote, Morsi prevailed – only to be encircled by Egypt’s military oligarchy, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

The narrative of this book concludes with the parliamentary elections of 2011–2012. During the first half of 2012, Morsi’s FJP and other parties began establishing popular sovereignty for the first time in the history of the Egyptian republic. The SCAF and its clients, however, manipulated Egypt’s pliable institutions and, in a dizzying set of decrees, obstructed the electorate’s will. On June 13, two weeks after the decades old State of Emergency had expired, the Ministry of Justice gave soldiers and security personnel the right to arrest civilians. On June 16, after Egypt’s highest court declared the country’s chief electoral law unconstitutional, the SCAF dissolved the main chamber of parliament. The generals then usurped legislative authority and claimed sweeping influence over the country’s constitutional assembly. Opposition leaders called it a coup. Finally, as polling stations closed on June 17, the SCAF amended its own Constitutional Declaration from March 30, 2011, effectively stripping the president of authority over national security and foreign affairs. Although Egyptians had voted, the leaders they chose could not steer the ship of state.