Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gvh9x Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T19:30:46.126Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Capability Building and Its Limitations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2013

Richard M. Locke
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Get access

Summary

As the shortcomings of the traditional compliance model became increasingly apparent, scholars and practitioners alike began to embrace an alternative approach to combating poor labor standards in global supply chains, built around the concept of capability building (sometimes referred to as capacity building). The capability-building model starts with the observation that factories throughout the developing world often lack the resources, technical expertise, and management systems necessary to address the root causes of compliance failures. Whereas the traditional compliance model sought to deter violations by policing and penalizing factories, capability building aims to prevent violations by providing the skills, technology and organizational capabilities that enable factories to enforce labor standards on their own. By providing suppliers with the technical know-how and management systems required to run more efficient businesses, this approach aims to improve these firms’ financial situations, thus allowing them to invest in higher wages and better working conditions. At the same time, for these factories to run more “lean” and/or “high-performance” operations, management must not only reorganize work but also up-skill and perhaps even empower shop-floor workers (e.g., to stop the line when identifying persistent quality problems). Capability-building programs envision a mutually reinforcing cycle in which more efficient plants invest in their workers and that these more skilled and empowered employees, in turn, promote continuous improvement processes throughout the factory, rendering these facilities more and more efficient and therefore more capable of producing high-quality goods on time, at cost, in the quantities desired by ever-more demanding customers, while at the same time respecting corporate codes of conduct.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Promise and Limits of Private Power
Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy
, pp. 78 - 104
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Fraser, Steven, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar
Tendler, Judith, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)Google Scholar
Walton, Richard E., Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joel E., and McKersie, Robert B., Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000)Google Scholar
Cohen, Joshua and Rogers, Joel, “Power and Reason,” in Fung, Archon and Wright, Erik Olin (Eds.), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003): 237–55Google Scholar
Locke, Richard M., Amengual, Mathew, and Mangla, Akshay, “Virtue out of Necessity?: Compliance, Commitment, and the Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply Chains,” Politics and Society 37, no. 3 (September 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devlin, Robert, Estevadeordal, Antoni, Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés (Eds.), The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, Harvard University Press, 2006): 188
Kagan, and Scholz, , “The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies,” in Hawkins, Keith and Thomas, John (Eds.), Enforcing Regulation (Boston: Kluwer/Nijoff, 1984): 69–74Google Scholar
Oka, Chikako, “Accounting for the Gaps in Labour Standard Compliance: The Role of Reputation-Conscious Buyers in the Cambodian Garment Industry,” European Journal of Development Research 22 (2010): 59–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oka, Chikako, “Channels of Buyer Influence and Labor Standard Compliance: The Case of Cambodia's Garment Sector,” Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations 17 (2010): 153–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swidler, Anne, “African Chiefdoms and Institutional Resilience: Public Goods and Private Strategies.” Presented at Center for European Studies, Harvard University, November 2, 2009, and “Return of the Sacred: What African Chiefs Teach Us about Secularization,” Sociology of Religion 71, no. 2 (2010)Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×