Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on Official Documents
- Abbreviations
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense
- Part One A War is Generated
- Part Two Cold War Togetherness
- 5 Britain Has a Plan
- 6 Southern Passage
- 7 “The Americans Will Not Sit Shiva”
- 8 How to Attack
- Part Three The First Victim of War
- Part Four Rallying Round Self-Defense
- Part Five War Without Limit?
- Part Six Peace Sidelined
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - “The Americans Will Not Sit Shiva”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on Official Documents
- Abbreviations
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense
- Part One A War is Generated
- Part Two Cold War Togetherness
- 5 Britain Has a Plan
- 6 Southern Passage
- 7 “The Americans Will Not Sit Shiva”
- 8 How to Attack
- Part Three The First Victim of War
- Part Four Rallying Round Self-Defense
- Part Five War Without Limit?
- Part Six Peace Sidelined
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As May turned to June, the United States tried a new tactic to restrain Israel. Egypt's vice president would be invited to Washington to explore ways out of the impasse with Israel, and especially to find an accommodation over the Gulf of Aqaba. Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin would meet with President Lyndon Johnson at the White House. The Americans thought the visit might be more productive if it was not publicized, but President Nasser insisted that it be public. Nasser told US special envoy Robert Anderson that Mohieddin could “explain his [Nasser's] position directly” to the US government. Unless these exercises were diversions, dispatching such high-level figures would be odd were Nasser planning to invade Israel. At the same time, President Nasser invited US Vice President Hubert Humphrey to visit Cairo.
End-Game
Time, however, was running out for stopping Israel. On June 1, a Government of National Unity was formed in Israel, bringing more hawkish members into the cabinet, Dayan among them. Dayan became Minister of Defense. If the cabinet had been divided on May 28, a new vote would obviously go in favor of immediate invasion. Secretary Rusk assured British officials on June 2 that “we have a breathing spell for the moment” as a result of the Israeli cabinet decision on May 28 to postpone hostilities. But, Rusk explained, “unless there is some change in Nasser's intentions regarding the Straits of Tiran this will not last long and it will be impossible to hold the Israelis.” Referring to the May 28 Israeli cabinet meeting, Rusk said, “We had a great deal of difficulty with them last Sunday when the decision in the Israeli Cabinet to hold back for the time being was very close (9 to 9).” Rusk was concerned that the next cabinet meeting would create “a crisis.” Rusk pointed to the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense as a development “hardly favorable to restraint.”
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-DefenseQuestioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War, pp. 59 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012