Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Reform in an imperfect world
- 2 “Deep democratization” and the control of corruption
- 3 First, do no harm – then, build trust: reform in fragile and post-conflict societies
- 4 Official Moguls: power, protection . . . and profits
- 5 Oligarchs and Clans: high stakes and insecurity
- 6 Elite Cartels: hanging on with a little help from my friends
- 7 Influence Market corruption: wealth and power versus justice
- 8 Staying power: building and sustaining citizen engagement
- Appendix Recognizing the syndromes of corruption
- References
- Index
- References
3 - First, do no harm – then, build trust: reform in fragile and post-conflict societies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Reform in an imperfect world
- 2 “Deep democratization” and the control of corruption
- 3 First, do no harm – then, build trust: reform in fragile and post-conflict societies
- 4 Official Moguls: power, protection . . . and profits
- 5 Oligarchs and Clans: high stakes and insecurity
- 6 Elite Cartels: hanging on with a little help from my friends
- 7 Influence Market corruption: wealth and power versus justice
- 8 Staying power: building and sustaining citizen engagement
- Appendix Recognizing the syndromes of corruption
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
All happy families resemble one another; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.
– Lev Tolstoy, Anna KareninaFear and, quite possibly, loathing too
Any anti-corruption strategy – particularly one emphasizing political contention – faces two sobering facts. First, many of the societies where corruption problems are worst are fragile in fundamental ways. Reform is difficult enough in sound, established states. In societies emerging from conflict or dictatorship, and in those where social divisions and distrust, poverty, or natural disasters have undermined leadership and citizenship, too much contention too soon could invite disaster. Second, at some point reformers must show that their efforts are producing benefits. What, if anything, can be done to build institutional and social foundations strong enough to withstand the stresses of reform? Are there ways to demonstrate results to enough segments of society to avoid intensified distrust or violence?
This chapter offers two arguments. First, reformers confronted with fragile situations must avoid making things worse in the name of doing good. Some good ideas may have to be deferred for a time while a foundation of trust – both among citizens, and between them and government – can be laid down. To that end, emphasis should be upon providing some basic services in a demonstrably fair and effective manner. Second, showing that positive changes are underway, and that citizens thus have a stake in reform, can be done by gathering and publishing indicators of government performance. That process can also point out vulnerabilities to corruption, and the effects of reform, in a wider variety of settings.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corruption, Contention, and ReformThe Power of Deep Democratization, pp. 57 - 85Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013