A rich ethnographic literature has provided detailed and engrossing depictions of clientelism in a number of settings (Chubb, 1982, Lande, 1983, Auyero, 2000b). This chapter does not set out to replicate such an enterprise. Instead, it makes a distinct contribution to our understanding of clientelism by articulating the behaviors that must be carried out by politicians, and the beliefs that must be held by citizens, for clientelist exchange to be viable. With respect to the former, politicians must establish their identity as personal gatekeepers for benefits and goods funded by the government. In the first part of this chapter, evidence from field work in small towns and cities in Argentina illuminates how politicians facilitate clientelism by claiming credit for, and heightening a sense of scarcity around, the goods and services they distribute. The description of the range of behaviors this entails lays the groundwork for the original measure of clientelism employed later in the book. With respect to the latter, clientelism succeeds when citizens are willing to vote (or engage in other acts of political expression) on an instrumental basis, and further when they believe their political behavior can be monitored by politicians. The second half of this chapter draws on secondary data from a variety of settings to show that these conditions can be, and are frequently, met.

The empirical examples employed here focus on how politicians facilitate clientelism when distributing state-funded social assistance.