Some proponents of deflationism with respect to truth contrast deflationism with various definitional theories of truth – such as definitions of truth in terms of correspondence or coherence – and claim that there is no hope of attaining an explicit definition of truth (see, for instance, Horwich 1990). The axiomatic approach to truth seems to be a hallmark of deflationism, although some deflationists flinch from the word axiomatization and prefer to call their axiomatization of truth an implicit definition. Presumably not all philosophers who reject (non-trivial) explicit definitions of truth qualify as deflationist; Donald Davidson's axiomatic account of truth, for instance, is usually not classified as deflationist. But since an axiomatization of truth seems to be a component of many deflationary conceptions of truth, the discussion of deflationism and the work on axiomatic theories of truth are closely related. So far the more formal contributions to the discussion about deflationism are based on typed axiomatic systems of truth. This applies, for instance, to the extensive debate about deflationism and conservativity. The concentration on typed systems of truth in this context seems to be borne out of the desire to avoid the intricacies of type-free systems and settle for a putatively widely accepted solution of the liar paradox. As I will argue, the focus on typed theories is misleading because in the context of type-free systems general claims about disquotational and therefore deflationist accounts of truth are no longer tenable.