The appearance of Ney’s two corps in the midst of his columns both surprised and pleased Blücher. Before receiving Yorck’s report on Ney’s departure, Blücher sensed that the marshal had walked into a trap. He correctly assumed that Sacken had continued his march west to Thomaswaldau, a few miles east of Bunzlau. Should this be the case, Ney’s line of retreat through Bunzlau was as good as cut and the marshal as good as encircled; Blücher need only close the net to crush him. His exuberance soared. Reports from Saxony claimed that Ney had been reinforced so that his army numbered six infantry and one cavalry corps, as well as the Young Guard. Completely oblivious to the implications of this French buildup, Blücher boasted to his wife on the morning of the 20th: “Yesterday I fought six French corps for six hours and forced all to retreat. The generals commanding against me were Ney, Macdonald, Marmont, Bertrand, Lauriston, [General Jean-Louis] Reynier, Sébastiani, and Mortier. I march immediately to pursue the enemy.”

That evening, Gneisenau drafted an attack disposition that would have led to Ney’s destruction if Yorck had been able to hold the marshal at the Gröditzberg long enough for Langeron and Sacken to envelop him. Worded in very simple, straightforward terms, the disposition called for Yorck to fix Ney’s front by attacking through Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg at daybreak on the 20th. Likewise at dawn, Langeron’s corps would march north from Lauterseiffen against Ney’s right flank while Sacken moved his troops south from Thomaswaldau directly to the rear of the enemy corps. Around midnight, shortly after the orderlies sped off with copies of the disposition, Yorck’s 10:00 P.M. report on Ney’s departure arrived. The whole operation had to be scrapped (see Map 2).