The studies in Parts II–IV of the book give rise to a number of questions which will be helpful in drawing conclusions as to what would be useful approaches to resolutions in the next crisis, amending Dodd–Frank and the European BRRD (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive) where necessary, and what actions should be avoided.

How did the authorities (Central Bank, Treasury, Financial Supervisory Authority, Deposit Insurance Agency, international organs such as the EU Commission and the IMF) handle the crisis? Were their actions effective and consistent? What was the end result for the bank in question? Was the end result a (more) stable banking system? What went wrong? Was it bad management, bad environment or both? Should the problems have been obvious earlier? What did supervisory authorities do and when? How was the bank resolved: resurrection, sale/merger or liquidation? Were “toxic assets” separated into a “bad bank,” inside or outside the bank? Was senior management ousted? Were culprits criminally or civilly charged? Could the resolution have been handled faster/more efficiently? Was taxpayer money involved? Have taxpayers been repaid? How was the upside for taxpayers achieved once a bank has returned to profitability? Were unsecured creditors and uninsured depositors hit?

We have studied 29 cases of government resolutions of failed or failing banks during the 2007–13 financial crises, grading the interventions according to the generally accepted academic scale of A–F. Table 25 shows the track record of the regulatory authorities in 15 countries.

The criteria for distributing these grades have been the following (to repeat the table from earlier for greater simplicity).

Factors leading to good grades (A–C)

1. Uninterrupted service: if a bank is closed Friday afternoon (as is standard FDIC practice), depositors should not know the difference on Monday morning and transactions should flow normally;

2. Proactive supervision: if regulatory authorities reacted before the situation became acute, they get extra points;

3. Speed of intervention: a shorter time span from recognition of the problem to intervention is positive;

4. Liquidity: did the central bank alleviate the inevitable liquidity crunch? How? When?

5. Guarantee for deposits: in an acute crisis, stemming a bank run with a guarantee is vital to prevent a bank run;

6. Guarantee for other liabilities: depending on the type of funding of the banking system, […]