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5 - Elite stabilization

from Part II - Structuring the regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2015

Graeme Gill
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Summary

Central to the consolidation of an authoritarian political system is the creation of mechanisms to ensure that the political elite is not disrupted by developments within that elite itself. Of course no amount of institutional engineering or the judicious selection of personnel can guarantee against the clash of personal ambition among individual members of the elite and the potential destabilizing effects that this can have. Personal relations within the cabinet, politburo, junta, or court are subject to the vagaries of personality and the opportunities created by the course of events, neither of which is wholly under the control of the leading figure or figures in the elite. Nevertheless, leaders have generally tried to minimize the possibility of intra-elite disruption and the focus of this chapter is how successive Russian presidents have gone about this. Following a discussion of the nature of factionalism, the chapter analyzes the changing dynamics of elite relations, including the place of economic elites, and the development of the profile of the leader himself and the way these have been shaped under successive presidents.

The main focus is the central political elite. At the top of the elite is the president, whose constitutional and actual powers make him the pivot around whom the rest of the political elite turns. Although exercising influence over him is not the only means whereby power is manifested – other members of the elite have some independent decision-making power and the capacity to block is widespread – this is one of the principal dimensions of power within the elite. Below the president are the leading officials in the main bureaucratic structures of the state: government, government ministries, leading bodies like the Security Council, upper levels of the armed forces and security apparatus, the Presidential Administration, and the advisers of leading political figures. Not all of these people are of equal standing, for example, leading officials in the Presidential Administration are more powerful than most ministers and there is a hierarchy among government ministers, and the position of individuals can change over time. Power within this group is structured along two essential axes: personal relations and institutional position.

Type
Chapter
Information
Building an Authoritarian Polity
Russia in Post-Soviet Times
, pp. 161 - 197
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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  • Elite stabilization
  • Graeme Gill, University of Sydney
  • Book: Building an Authoritarian Polity
  • Online publication: 05 November 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316417720.006
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  • Elite stabilization
  • Graeme Gill, University of Sydney
  • Book: Building an Authoritarian Polity
  • Online publication: 05 November 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316417720.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Elite stabilization
  • Graeme Gill, University of Sydney
  • Book: Building an Authoritarian Polity
  • Online publication: 05 November 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316417720.006
Available formats
×