Given the potential for misunderstanding inherent in asymmetric relationships and the disparity of power between the two states, one might expect an asymmetric relationship to last only as long as it is preserved by the supple diplomacy of the weak and the forbearance of the strong. And indeed from 1800 to 1999 there have been 198 wars between states with a force disparity of greater than ten to one, according to one count. At this rate of exactly one war per year over the past two centuries, one might expect either that weaker states have been eliminated or that they have learned their lessons and have become docile.

On the contrary: As numerous scholars have pointed out, asymmetric conflicts have become more problematic in the twentieth century. Most wars, and almost all wars in the past sixty years, have ended in settlements negotiated between the belligerents rather than in capitulation by one side. Moreover, weaker states have often prevailed. The occasional defeat of the strong is the object of theoretical attention for many scholars; however, the equally interesting process of normalizing hostile asymmetric relations has been neglected. Here we will examine the whole cycle of the emergence of hostility, stalemate, and its resolution.

Asymmetry theory is premised on the reality of power disparity. More muscle does make a difference. Therefore, the continued existence of weaker states and their occasional ability to prevail in asymmetric conflicts at first appears anomalous. Sometimes the weak win because of the mistakes of the strong induced by complacency and arrogance. But in any case, the same difference of perspectives that increases the likelihood of conflict because of misperception also contributes to stalemate. For b, hostility with A is a mortal threat, while A cannot be similarly threatened by b. Stalemate can result from A's attempt to fight a limited war that b cannot afford to lose. It is far easier to fall into asymmetric conflict than it is to crawl out of asymmetric stalemate toward normalization, but the frustration of A and the suffering of b can provide sufficient motivation to each side.

HAZARDS OF NOVELTY

The best friend of a normal asymmetric relationship is habit, and its worst enemy is novelty. When there exists a shared common sense regarding the relationship, each new transaction is linked to a familiar past and to a future that is expected to be not much different.