Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-lrf7s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-27T16:50:53.372Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Virtuality of Concepts

from PART III - DELEUZE'S TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2017

Peter Hertz-Ohmes
Affiliation:
SUNY Oswego
Get access

Summary

Empiricism is generally confronted with the preconceived notion that it carelessly disregards actual thought processes. The rejection of a priori sources for concepts, unanimously ascribed to empiricism by Kantian and Hegelian tradition, appears as general denial of philosophical reflection and its claims regarding a categorial mediation of experience. This classic condemnation of empiricism has rooted itself so deeply in continental thought that the non-positivist critique of metaphysics from Schopenhauer to Derrida, while no doubt making use of empiricist theorems, does so only with negative intent and careful delimitation (see Derrida 1988: 127). It seems paradoxical to this critique to conceive pure experience conceptually: therefore sensible immediacy functions merely as a non-identical corrective that sheds light on the deficient or abstractly subsumptive character of philosophical concepts. Nietzsche has formulated this critical aspect of empiricist abstraction theory in a particularly effective way in his treatise ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’.

This instrumental character of the concept, as described by Nietzsche, defines its pragmatic truth value. Concepts are set up in the empirical milieu of singular events, to which they are related genetically – through a reduction of complexity. At the same time they take on a nihilist tendency as soon as they are freed from the status of their genesis and claim validity as pure logical predicates. The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School also makes use of this figure of thought in order to reflect especially on the unavoidable impairment and distortion of the given within the concept. Nevertheless, that theory fixes the concept's traditional form using historical-philosophical means.

What we differentiate will appear […] negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity: as long as its demand for totality will be its measure for whatever is not identical with it.

(Adorno 1981: 5–6)

The negativist conception of difference corresponds, says Adorno, to the constitution of consciousness in the blinding context of capitalist working conditions. His analysis presupposes the factual incapability of contemporary thought to affirm differences, a hopeless situation that can at best receive only critical reflection.

Type
Chapter
Information
Gilles Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism
From Tradition to Difference
, pp. 165 - 223
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×