The Truce that came into effect on 11 July 1921 officially ended what is now most often referred to as the War of Independence and came as the culmination of the most violent six months of the war. Relieved civilians celebrated the arrival of peace and Volunteers returned home to bask in newfound freedom, safety, and adulation. Violence did not come to a complete stop at 12 p.m. on 11 July but the weeks following the ceasefire are notable for the relative absence of political violence. Total attacks against the RIC, their families and suppliers, for instance, remained in single figures for the remainder of June with no attacks at all reported in August. RIC county inspectors reflected positively on conditions in their counties and the British administration remained confident that both IRA and Crown forces would obey the terms of the Truce; early breaches were considered unimportant and unreflective. Over time patience wore thin as non-violent breaches became the norm and the RIC were increasingly frustrated by restrictions imposed by the Truce and their inability to interfere effectively. The liaison system, whereby liaison officials were appointed on both sides to enquire into breaches of the Truce, only seemed to generate further irritation. Conflicting evidence, denials, and counter-accusations made it difficult for either side to settle complaints adequately. Dan Breen insisted that ‘as time went on the Black and Tans were guilty of many breaches’ while police reports in August began to suggest that it was the IRA who were not, or had never been, obeying Truce terms. Any settlement, they believed, would come at the behest of the gunmen.

This chapter will explore the twelve months between the Truce and the Civil War under three headings. The first section will treat non-lethal IRA breaches of Truce regulations. The second will focus on the labelling of civilians as suspicious by local IRA intelligence. Primarily using a substantial collection of intelligence notes, it will profile the ‘suspects’, explore what brought them to the attention of the IRA, and suggest some patterns in the ways in which the IRA's defined civilians as enemies. The third section will take a broader approach to civilian defiance and IRA punishment by dealing with two specific groups that did not naturally fit into the accepted nationalist or republican standard: first, Protestants and loyalists and, secondly, the disbanded members of the RIC and their families.