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Essay IV - ‘I wish to do as much by Poesy’: Amidst a Byronic Poetics

from PART 2 - POETICS

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Summary

According to Peter Atkins

poets may aspire to understanding, [but] their talents are more akin to entertaining self–deception. They may be able to emphasise delights in the world, but they are deluded if they and their admirers believe that their identification of the delights and their use of poignant language are enough for comprehension. Philosophers, too, I am afraid, have contributed to the understanding of the universe little more than poets […]. They have not contributed much that is novel until after novelty has been discovered by scientists […]. While poetry titillates and theology obfuscates, science liberates.

Such diminutions of poetry are nothing new. In opposing ‘poignant’, ‘entertaining’ and ‘delights’ to the rather more solid–sounding ‘comprehension’ and ‘understanding’, Atkins stands in a long rhetorical tradition. Locke's famous account of ‘wit’, for instance, although part of a broader and more thoughtful analysis of language and its representations, works along similar lines:

Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment, or deepest Reason. For Wit lying most in the assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, therby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy: Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, Ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all People; because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it.

The tone and diction imply a hierarchy of mental modalities in which ‘judgment’ (‘clearest’, ‘deepest’) is characterized as more careful, reliable and searching than ‘wit’ (‘entertainment’, ‘pleasantry’, ‘misled’) as a means of understanding ourselves and our world.

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Publisher: Liverpool University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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