From that point in 1974 the story of the British Government's role must take account of a number of further developments: the nature of successive efforts made to restore devolved Governments to Northern Ireland; the methods used to combat ongoing violence resulting from both republican and loyalist terrorists; and the nature of the dialogue – whether one terms it ‘exchange of information’ or ‘negotiation’ – conducted at first covertly and then overtly between the British Government or its representatives and the mouthpieces of terrorism.

Successive British Governments were to seek by a variety of means to move the local political parties towards a new agreement on future political structures, but also considered at times ‘unboycottable’ measures which could move the political process forward. Here some basic realities must be spelled out. Any machinery of government requiring for its operation a direct participation of locally elected people must, to succeed initially and prove stable thereafter, enjoy the willing support of local parties on terms with which their electorate can live, either enthusiastically or with a degree of reluctance. By 1974 it was quite clear to me that nationalist opinion would never again accept a system under which unionists alone exercised executive power, even if inhibited by extensive safeguards and protections against abuse. Anything resembling a Cabinet in Northern Ireland would have to embody both nationalist and unionist elements, and it followed from this that any route blocked by either interest would prove a cul-de-sac. Faced by the propensity of one party or another not merely to veto progress but to withhold participation from negotiations to achieve it, one could expect from time to time a strong desire to present the local parties with a fait accompli achieved behind their backs or over their heads, if need be in direct negotiations between the British and Irish Governments. As we shall see, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was the product of just such impatience, and of the quest for an ‘unboycottable’ way to make progress. But in truth such steps were likely to prove at worst harmful and at best palliative; real and enduring progress in a divided Northern Ireland could only be obtained by the willingness of local parties to work together. This necessarily raised the question whether all parties would have to be involved.