Since the Iranian Islamic revolution, the voices of Islam have made some observers curious as to one question: was modernity accepted by ‘different’, non-Western cultures? Referring to the example of ‘new Islam’, Islamism, some critics argue that modernity has been refused by non-Western cultures (Mestrovic, 1998: 156). Others argue that the Islamist movement clearly indicates the arrival of the postmodern era (see, for instance, Ahmed, 1992; Sayyid, 1997). Turkey presents a particularly interesting case for observers who want to understand the nature of the relations between Islam and modernity. With its particular project of modernity, Kemalism, Turkey has often been seen as the model of modernity for the Muslim world. However, the Iranian Islamic revolution represented a serious challenge to Kemalism, because Iran had chosen the Turkish way of modernization, to an important extent, as its model for development.

Turkey is often seen as representing a ‘secular’ Muslim society. Yet Turkey is also known for its tension-ridden relations between modernity and Islam. Recently, Islamic voices have been heard more strongly than ever before, yet, in turn, secularists speak out against Islamism. On the one hand, Turkey has been regarded as ‘Western’, but on the other hand, the Islamic face of Turkey is a constant presence in relation to political issues. For instance, Turkey is (at the time of writing) being considered for membership of the European Union, but it is also a member of the Islamic Union. This duality immediately divides observers of Turkey into two opposite camps. For instance, Lewis (1988: 4) states that ‘[in] almost all of the sovereign states with a clear Muslim majority, Islam is the state religion; many of them have clauses in their constitutions establishing the Holy law of Islam as either the basis of law or the major source of legislation. The outstanding exception is the Turkish republic, which under the guidance of its first president, Kemal Atatürk, adopted a series of [secularizing] laws in the 1920s’. But, on the other hand, Ahmed (1993: 98) argues that ‘[the] challenge to the notion of Turkey as a European nation, the strong, unmistakable signs of Turks rediscovering their Islamic identity are everywhere: the full mosques, the pride in the Ottoman past, the women with their hijab, even men wearing the fez’.