The relationship between determinism and freedom has been one of the main concerns in philosophy throughout history. Many philosophers have opposed freedom (or chance) to necessity (or causality) when discussing whether freedom is present or not in the connection between processes and their results, as a way to differentiate between necessary (or causal) processes and free (or random) processes. Different definitions and notions have been used in the debates over determinism. On the one hand, the terms contingency, randomness, emergency, uncertainty, free will and freedom seem to point to an indeterministic position on reality. On the other hand, the notions of necessity, causation, law-likeness, predictability and fatalism seem to suggest a deterministic stance. But does science properly distinguish between these notions? If so, how does it do this? Furthermore, how does philosophy contribute towards the elucidation of such distinctions? Does a deterministic or an indeterministic world view affect theological thought?

In the deterministic view, everything that has happened (past), everything that happens (present) and everything that will happen (future) is already determined, conditioned or established. During the classical and medieval periods, determinism had a metaphysical connotation, derived from the principle of universal causation. In modern times, however, deterministic conceptions laid their theoretical foundations in scientific knowledge and were associated with the notions of prediction and law-likeness. Paradigmatic mechanistic determinism regarded the world as a great clockwork-like system.