Since it emerged from the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has fought two wars in Chechnya, the first, from December 1994 to August 1996, and the second, from October 1999 to the present. During both these wars, Russia has committed political errors and military crimes that have merited the criticism that they have received from Russians and Westerners alike. Yet while focusing upon the faulty execution of these wars, many critics have failed fully to consider the deeper causes behind them. Some observers have based their analyses upon assumptions and sentiments that have much to do with the myths of another historical era and little to do with the realities that have haunted the North Caucasus throughout the last decade. Indeed, many have failed to consider the region at all, preferring to see the conflicts along a North/South axis running from Moscow to Grozny while neglecting the tensions between Chechnya and its Caucasian neighbours to the East and West. The result of this neglect has often been a mix of misconceptions and partial truths that have only made it easier for Russian officials to dismiss legitimate criticism of their errors and excesses. Because it inadvertently strengthens the hands of hardliners on all sides, an imbalanced critique can only serve to perpetuate instability in Chechnya.

Why has Chechnya spent the past 15 years lurching from one political failure to the next? The Chechen wars are mired within a multi-layered mythology that has flourished, in no small part, because this region is so little visited and so much misunderstood.