Chapter 1 ended by noting that a meaning-theory must be a theory of understanding in the sense that, if the clauses of the core of the theory aren't already specifications of speakers' knowledge, then we must be able to ascribe knowledge of them to speakers. In this chapter we investigate Dummett's views on three issues – manifestation, modesty and molecularity – whose combined weight largely determines the role of knowledge in a meaning-theory. The first issue – manifestation – concerns the justification for ascribing a piece of knowledge – in particular for ascribing knowledge of meanings, as described by our preferred theory – to a speaker. The second issue – modesty versus fullbloodedness – concerns the terms in which we characterize knowledge of meanings. And the last issue – molecularity versus holism – takes up the question of whether knowledge of the theory is to be ascribed en bloc or in “small chunks”.

Manifestation

Frege takes one important step in introducing the notion of knowledge into the theory of meaning: it won't do simply to discuss meaning in terms of reference; we need to be able to attribute knowledge of (the content of) the clauses of a theory of reference to speakers. Dummett recommends that this step should be followed by another: we cannot simply attribute such knowledge; we need to justify such attributions by explaining how possession of such knowledge is manifested.

There are a number of thoughts running through Dummett's insistence on manifestation.