Introduction

Essentialism presents a view of reality that is very different from that of any kind of passivism. Essentialists believe that:

1. (a) inanimate matter is not passive, but essentially active;

2. (b) the actions of things depend on their causal powers and other dispositional properties;

3. (c) dispositional properties are genuine properties, and intrinsic to the things that have them;

4. (d) the essential properties of things always include dispositional properties;

5. (e) elementary causal relations involve necessary connections between events, namely between the displays of dispositional properties and the circumstances that give rise to them;

6. (f) the laws of nature describe the ways that members of natural kinds are logically required (or are necessarily disposed) to act, given their essential natures; and

7. (g) the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, because anything that belongs to a natural kind is logically required (or is necessarily disposed) to behave as its essential properties dictate.

These are all highly controversial theses that are anathema to most philosophers. Those I call “Humeans” would argue that:

1. (a) inanimate matter is essentially passive, never intrinsically active;

2. (b) things behave as they are required to by the laws of nature;

3. (c) the dispositional properties of things (including their causal powers) are not real properties, and are never intrinsic to the things that have them;

4. (d) the essential properties of things never include any dispositional ones;

5. (e) causal relations are always between logically independent events;

6. (f) the laws of nature are universal regularities imposed on things whose identities are independent of the laws; and

7. (g) the laws of nature are contingent, not necessary.