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6 - Transcendental freedom of Will

Dale Jacquette
Dale Jacquette
Affiliation:
University of Bern
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Summary

As the will itself is not phenomenon, not representation or object, but thing-in-itself, it is also not subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of all object. Thus it is not determined as consequent by a reason or concept or ground, and so it knows no necessity; in other words, it is free. The concept of freedom is therefore really a negative one, since its content is merely the denial of necessity, in other words, the denial of the relation of consequent to its ground according to the principle of sufficient reason … Everything as phenomenon, as object, is absolutely necessary; in itself it is will, and this is perfectly free to all eternity.

(WWR 1: 287)

World and individual

The individual thinking subject, like the world as a whole, has both an inner and outer aspect. There is a parallelism in Schopenhauer's philosophy between, on the grand scale, the world as representation and thing-in-itself as Will, and, on the personal scale, the individual's body and phenomenal will to life. The will to life also has a dual nature. It consists primarily of psychological episodes occurring in real space and time, as an overlay on a transcendent core of unmotivated, uncaused, objectless and hence subject-less, unindividuated and inexplicable pure willing. Pure willing is identical in each willing subject with Will as the one and only thing-in-itself, that, unlike the body and mind, is indestructible and immortal.

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Chapter
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The Philosophy of Schopenhauer , pp. 180 - 202
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2005

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