Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-jwnkl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-12T10:26:28.716Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core

Conclusion

Charlie Huenemann
Affiliation:
Utah State University
Get access

Summary

Is rationalism plausible?

Rationalism is founded on an extraordinary assumption: that human reason has within itself the resources for discerning and understanding reality's deepest fixtures. It is easy to imagine this assumption being false. Perhaps human reason is simply incapable of working out the deepest truths about reality, or perhaps we can do so only through extensive empirical investigation. Perhaps human reason evolved under prehistoric pressures, and we are very talented at building fires and catching rabbits but very poor at doing metaphysics. Perhaps there is no such thing as ultimate reality, as crazy at that may sound, and all human experience is nothing but interpretations upon interpretations. Perhaps the biggest truths are inconceivable. All of these are possibilities, but rationalism denies them. As said in the introduction, rationalism holds that the innermost skeleton of reality and the innermost skeleton of the human mind are one and the same.

And what do our rationalists conclude? Descartes concludes that there are two radically different kinds of substance in the world, minds and bodies, and that in every person there is one of each in mysterious interaction. Spinoza concludes that there can be only one substance, which is both thinking and extended, and that the apparent individuals in the universe are in fact particular ways in which that one substance is expressed. Leibniz concludes that there are infinitely many minds which mirror one another in such a way as to produce the appearance of a shared world of bodies in motion.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Conclusion
  • Charlie Huenemann, Utah State University
  • Book: Understanding Rationalism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654000.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Conclusion
  • Charlie Huenemann, Utah State University
  • Book: Understanding Rationalism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654000.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Charlie Huenemann, Utah State University
  • Book: Understanding Rationalism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654000.008
Available formats
×