Some deaths are bad, and worse than others. Are more of these bad deaths worse than few? It seems obvious that this is so. It would be good, often, to save someone from death. Would it be better to save more people from death? Again it seems obvious that it would. And these claims are connected. Because more deaths is worse, saving more is better. But, notoriously, these seemingly obvious claims have been denied. It is not true that more deaths is worse. And it is not true that it is better to save more than fewer. I shall consider some of the arguments for these strange views, altogether rejecting those addressed to the first, while acknowledging the force in certain of those addressed to the second.

First efforts

Here are three arguments, the last of which will resurface later. First, it is not worse when more die, as death is not bad at all. The Epicureans will believe this. The argument is valid, but most of us deny the premise. Second, as death is the ultimate evil, and involves each of us in losing infinite amounts of good, then more deaths cannot be worse. It is infinitely bad to lose infinite good. So there is no room for further badness to accrue. Most of us deny the premise. And the argument is not even valid.