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7 - Realism in ethics

Brian Ellis
Affiliation:
La Trobe University
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Summary

If the metaphysics of scientific realism is accepted as a first philosophy, then an acceptable moral theory must be one that is compatible with it. It cannot be a theory that depends on any kind of mental determinism that is incompatible with physical determinism. Nor can it be one that is not compatible with evolutionary theory. Human beings must be physically plausible systems. Nevertheless, it is a fact that I can decide what I want to do, and act on my decision. So, my coming to that decision must be achieved by a physical process, presumably meta-causal process, that establishes in me the disposition to act on some appropriate cue in the way that I have decided. Moreover, my acting on this decision must be an action that is triggered by the occurrence of this cue. It cannot be just a matter of chance that I happen to act in this way, given the occurrence of the cue. For then it would not be an act for which I was personally responsible. Similar conditions apply to acts of collective responsibility. For a group to decide collectively to act in some way, and act on that decision, it must first decide, by some appropriate deliberative procedure, what to do, on what occasion to do it, and then put in place a mechanism for triggering that decision. If these conditions are all satisfied, and the trigger occurs, then the group may be said to be collectively responsible to the action they have taken.

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Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2009

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  • Realism in ethics
  • Brian Ellis, La Trobe University
  • Book: The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654529.009
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  • Realism in ethics
  • Brian Ellis, La Trobe University
  • Book: The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654529.009
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Realism in ethics
  • Brian Ellis, La Trobe University
  • Book: The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654529.009
Available formats
×