For just over a year between August 1795, and August 1796, Nelson – then a commodore – commanded a small squadron off the north-west coast of Italy. His main task was to act in support of the Austrians, who were attempting to defend their possessions on the Italian peninsula from the armies of revolutionary France.

In 1795, Nelson operated out of Vado Bay near Genoa (then still a neutral port), where the Austrian commander-in-chief, General de Vins, had his headquarters, imposing a close blockade of the coast and protecting the army's seaward flank. However, in March 1796, General Napoleon Bonaparte took command of the French Army of Italy and began the brilliant campaign that first established his reputation. Nelson returned to his former cruising ground in January 1796, this time to blockade French-held ports and to harry the French coastal supply route. He even succeeded in capturing Napoleon's siege train at Oneglia on 30 May. But the French advance was inexorable: in June, the key port of Leghorn fell to their victorious armies, and Genoa was forced to submit in September. There was little that the British could do to assist their allies ashore, and so they concentrated their attention on securing Corsica from attack – a task in which Nelson played a key role by capturing the outlying islands of Elba (10 July 1796) and Capraia (18 September 1796). However, the entry of Spain into the war on the side of France in the autumn of 1796 meant that even Corsica had to be abandoned and, eventually, in December, the British withdrew their fleet altogether from the Mediterranean.

Although the campaign itself ended in failure, it was an important stage in the development of Nelson's career. A.T. Mahan – whose account of the various actions, although written over 100 years ago, is still by far the best – wrote that ‘the duty had the distinction of being not only arduous from the purely naval standpoint, but delicate in the diplomatic management and tact required’. These last qualities are well to the fore in the masterly letter (213) dated 12 October 1795 and addressed to the nervous General de Vins, who commanded the Austrian troops: