The statecraft of Edward III is a subject that has been much in discussion over the last two generations, as historians have begun to recognize the achievement of this king in effecting a remarkable rapprochement between the ambitions of the crown and the interests of the political community. Secrecy is not one of the more obvious attributes of this politique: as Michael Prestwich has done so much to demonstrate, Edward III's popularity and effectiveness relied in no small way on his practice of open government and his recognition, both rhetorically and substantively, of the benefits of public debate. In other respects, however, it is very clear that Edward understood the strategic importance of confidentiality and subterfuge. In 1330 he and a small group of household retainers hatched the secret plot that allowed them to ambush Roger Mortimer at Nottingham Castle and restore the young king to rightful power. In 1331, the king travelled in disguise as a pilgrim on a secret mission to the continent for discussions with Philip VI of France. In 1340 he arrived back in England unannounced from a long period of absence on the continent in order to catch the domestic administration unawares and punish those whom he saw as abusing his trust. In 1344–6, Edward planned the major campaign that would culminate in the victories of Crécy and Calais under a strict code of confidentiality, such that even at the point of departure some of his major commanders had no idea as to where the royal armada was intending to sail.