Although sectional conflict and economic recovery were Nigeria's chief domestic problems during Obasanjo's first presidential term, the foreground of public life was occupied by a struggle between executive and legislature. The division of power between them, with the restraint and compromise it was designed to foster, was the core of the constitution whose drafting Obasanjo had overseen in 1976–9. Nigerians familiar with the parent American system assured their compatriots that conflict between the two branches of government was healthy and predictable. In Nigerian circumstances, however, it was particularly abrasive. This was partly due to what Obasanjo once called Nigerians’ ‘unusual love for grandeur’, inherited from honour cultures. ‘The first term from 1999 was characterised by the typical Nigerian overassertiveness, of one side trying to establish dominance over the other,’ an experienced senator reflected. ‘It is fair to say that the problem was the operators, not the constitution, not the environment.’ Yet it was not only the operators. The architects of the constitution had intended that while the legislature would prevent abuse of power by the executive, shared membership of a majority party would ensure the conduct of government. Shagari suffered the consequences of this optimistic assumption when his lack of a party majority left him no safeguard against abuse of power by the legislature. Obasanjo was determined to avoid Shagari's fate by dominating the legislature. For that he had the advantage of a large party majority, but now it was a party without policy or discipline.