Except for the French indemnity question, the American economy at the end of 1834 had an open field to run if it wanted to do so. And it did. A former New York mayor spoke for many when he had said that the year 1833 had ended in an air of uncertainty and confusion. What Mr Hone did not know was that the United States was about to embark on a speculative expansion on a scale not seen in over a decade, and which at least one twentieth-century commentator has compared to the run-up to the depression of the 1930s. The year 1834 ended with Treasury secretary Levi Woodbury proudly announcing the government's solvency, and the world saw the ‘happy and unprecedented spectacle’ of a developing country without a public debt. Throughout the ensuing boom of 1834–6, Barings charted a course of watchfulness and caution. Bates and Ward were apprehensive about Jackson, and about what his successor might do. The competition for American business also intensified among British merchants bankers, about which Ward fretted. It seemed that the United States was where abundant opportunity lay.

In the long run this was so. But in the middle 1830s there developed a trap of sorts created by circumstances coming together that made American finance and commerce appear vibrant and appealing. With others making money quickly all around them, these years tested Barings' rule to stay disciplined, liquid and avoid leverage by borrowing. However, as Ward eventually cautioned, these circumstances were fragile and subject to collapse with little warning.