Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Kingdom and Colony: The Mythology of Race (Pre-history to 1948)
- Part II Dominion to Republic: The Politics of Language (1948–1977)
- Part III The New Monarch: Jayewardene in Control (1977–1983)
- Part IV The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
- Part V Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
- Chapter 9 The Accord in Action
- Chapter 10 The Façade Cracks
- Chapter 11 The Last Hurrah
- Part VI Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
- Part VII Using the Spoon: Wijetunge as President (1993–1994)
- Part VIII The Procrastination of a Princess: Kumaratunga in charge (1994–2001)
- Part IX The Baby without the Bathwater: Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister (2001–2004)
- Part X Guarding the Change: Rajapakse's Emergence (2004–2006)
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 9 - The Accord in Action
from Part V - Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Kingdom and Colony: The Mythology of Race (Pre-history to 1948)
- Part II Dominion to Republic: The Politics of Language (1948–1977)
- Part III The New Monarch: Jayewardene in Control (1977–1983)
- Part IV The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
- Part V Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
- Chapter 9 The Accord in Action
- Chapter 10 The Façade Cracks
- Chapter 11 The Last Hurrah
- Part VI Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
- Part VII Using the Spoon: Wijetunge as President (1993–1994)
- Part VIII The Procrastination of a Princess: Kumaratunga in charge (1994–2001)
- Part IX The Baby without the Bathwater: Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister (2001–2004)
- Part X Guarding the Change: Rajapakse's Emergence (2004–2006)
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Political consequences of the Accord
Immediately after the signing of the Accord over 6000 Indian troops arrived in Sri Lanka, a number that grew tenfold by the end of the year. The reason was ostensibly to ensure the surrender of arms by the terrorists. However, as the presence of a couple of Indian frigates anchored off the coast of Colombo for a few days after the Accord indicated, it was felt that Indian forces would also provide security in case demonstrations against the Accord turned dangerous. Indeed some saw their presence in the north as a safeguard against disaffection over the Accord among Sri Lankan forces. Later, since such disaffection did not prove dangerous, the gradual takeover of security responsibilities in Tamil areas by the Indians released Sri Lankan forces to be deployed elsewhere. For the moment the greater threat to the Accord seemed to come from the south. In the north, after holding out for a few more days, Prabhakaran came back from India and, though claiming that it was only the method of struggle for the cherished separate state of Eelam that had changed and not the goal itself, he ordered his followers to turn in their arms.
The proliferation of Indian troops indicated the reversal of Athulathmudali's approach, and he did not attended the signing of the Accord nor the reception for Gandhi though he slipped into the official dinner for which only a few ministers had been invited.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Declining Sri LankaTerrorism and Ethnic Conlict, the Legacy of J. R. Jayewardene, pp. 119 - 130Publisher: Foundation BooksPrint publication year: 2007