The long shadow of Piłsudski: Soviet reactions to the coup d’état of May 1926

In the spring of 1926 it became evident that a violent clash was brewing on the horizon of Polish politics. Piłsudski embarked on a bid for a return to the military and, in the long run, once again to control the governing of Poland. On the other side of the political divide the right-wingers were also beginning to think about a violent takeover of power to resolve the chronic political stalemate. The personality they envisaged as their strong man to clear up the crisis was General Jozef Haller. Tension reached a climax in late April 1926, in connection with the fall of Aleksander Skrzyński's government and rumours of a prospective coup d'etat, spread by both the left and right. “There was a growing general belief that a coup was imminent,” Włodzimierz Suleja writes, “the only question being who would stand at its head.” Piłsudski decided to take the initiative. He took the designation of Wincenty Witos for the post of prime minister as a personal challenge: Witos’ appointment would have facilitated a return of the Chjeno–Piast government of 1923. On the morning of 12th May Piłsudski started an operation which was intended as an armed show of strength but turned into a violent, albeit brief clash with government forces. Two days later Witos’ ministry resigned, and President Stanisław Wojciechowski stepped down. Over the next few days the coup d'etat was legalised: Maciej Rataj, Speaker of Sejm and acting Head of State, appointed a new government headed by Kazimierz Bartel. Piłsudski became the new Minister for Military Affairs and Inspector-General for the Armed Forces, but in fact he was now the principal wielder of political power.

The developments in Poland came as no surprise to the Soviets. Moscow had been closely observing events in Poland for a long time, carefully following all the symptoms indicating that the Piłsudskiites were preparing for a showdown with the Right. But the attitude of the Bolsheviks to Piłsudski and his doings was not unanimous. The prospect of his comeback certainly generated great concern, which was hardly surprising, since the Marshal of Poland was traditionally regarded as the number-one enemy of the Soviets, and leader of the anti-communist forces in Eastern Europe.