Ooi Kee Beng: May I suggest that we continue discussing Southeast Asia as a concept?

Wang Gungwu: As I mentioned earlier, the term really came out of World War II, from the Mountbatten Command in Colombo, which was called the South East Asia Command. The term stuck, and it did so because of the advent of decolonization. The British and the Americans found it useful, and I think the French and Dutch followed thereafter. Decolonization made them think of the region's future, which they feared would be similar to what had become of the Balkans — fragmented, and in effect a power vacuum. European experiences were transposed on to the region, and the notion was that, where there is fragmentation, big powers would intervene. So a quick look around showed an independent but fragile India on one side, and on the other, Communist China, one of the five powers in the United Nations Security Council.

The strategic planners saw a potential political vacuum, and to get down to work they needed a coordinated bigger picture. Identifying Southeast Asia as one region helped them visualize the future. This didn't happen immediately, by the way. The Americans took some time to accept it because they thought in terms of East Asia, or the Western Pacific. They never looked at South Asia much, the way the British and the French did. On their side, Europeans saw India and they saw China; and they saw the region in between as a residue. So the French used the term “Indochine”, which is very interesting because it showed that the French had understood the area to be a bit of China and a bit of India. For Western powers that had been moving eastwards, this area would have indeed been orientated through references to India and China.

OKB: In the early days, the British were denoting the region as “Farther India”.

WGW: Farther India, yes. They were thinking in terms of the projection of British power out of India, an extension into the Malay Peninsula and into Burma. Burma was actually managed as a province of India, a tail end of India; something the Burmese have never forgiven them for. So their view was always India-centred. The Americans however were concerned with the Philippines and Japan, and tended strategically to be China-centred.