Introduction

In the late 1990s, the global price for natural rubber soared and Xishuangbanna — a major rubber producing area in remote southwest China — grew rich. Across the border in northern Laos, farmers and state officials looked on in envy at this miracle cash crop. Some began experimenting with it. When the Chinese government established the Opium Replacement Program (ORP) in 2004, it was welcomed in Laos as further support for the growing rubber sector. As a result, Lao rubber cultivation expanded significantly. The ORP was established to incentivize large-scale agribusiness projects to provide alternative livelihoods schemes as substitutes for opium cultivation in Laos and Myanmar. Chinese companies rushed to take advantage of the ORP and its financial supports. Though a range of cash crops were allowed, the vast majority of ORP funding went to establishing rubber plantations. Amid the initial rush, Chinese investors, Lao farmers and Lao state officials recounted stories of rubber's success in Xishuangbanna as justification. Rubber was a silver bullet that contributed to development, poverty alleviation, and modernization. But in 2011, as global rubber prices plummeted, dreams of new motorbikes, paved roads, corporate profits and hefty government revenues were suddenly dashed.

The drop in rubber prices also dashed claims that China's development success was wholly replicable in other contexts.