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Dispute settlement is entrenched in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through the Part XV compulsory mechanisms. It is also reflected in UNCLOS's indication that delimitation of the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf is to be by way of agreement between coastal states. While maritime boundary delimitation may be viewed as dominated by judicialization, that is not reflected in UNCLOS. The maritime boundary delimitation project unleashed by UNCLOS gave primacy to delimitation by agreement, with third party settlement under Part XV the secondary mechanism. The 2018 Australia/Timor-Leste maritime boundary settlement highlights how, even when Part XV third party mechanisms were used, the coastal states were able to reach agreement on a maritime boundary by negotiation, without recourse to judicialization.
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak define “legalization” as international legal constraints, and “judicialization” of the law of the sea as states’ sense that their policy options are legally bounded, and that courts have gained the authority to define the meaning of the law of the sea. The authors are generally correct that the processes of legalization and judicialization under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) fundamentally alter interstate behavior in significant ways, whatever the choice of dispute settlement mechanisms a state party to UNCLOS has made. However, as I explain in this essay, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) should be the most often utilized mechanism to settle UNCLOS disputes, and its potential as a dispute settlement mechanism has yet to be used to the fullest extent.
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak make an important contribution to the literature that considers if and how international courts influence the behavior of states beyond the process of adjudication. Their analysis shows that states that declare an Article 287 choice for dispute resolution when signing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are more likely to solve their conflicts in peaceful ways, compared to signatories who do not, suggesting this relationship is not epiphenomenal. Their finding provides us with yet another piece of the puzzle in understanding how legalization and judicialization shape the behavior of states. We still, however, have much to learn about how states interact with legalization and adjudication. This essay argues that while the article's statistical analysis adds to the evidence that judicialization influences state behavior, the uniqueness of UNCLOS makes it doubtful that we can replicate this finding for other international courts and tribunals. In addition, while the statistical analysis suggests that states that make Article 287 declarations behave differently in the face of maritime conflict, we do not really know why states made the choice to declare a preference for adjudication. Finally, given that states strongly prefer negotiations to using UNCLOS formal adjudication mechanisms, we need to understand better the path to adjudication or arbitration.
Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak's examination of the impact of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Article 287 declarations on the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes significantly advances the literature on the relationship between international law/international courts and maritime issues. To their credit, the authors employ a wide range of empirical tests in the article to provide readers with confidence in the empirical results. Nonetheless, there are some important limitations in their approach. Drawing on insights from the causal inference literature, I argue that Mitchell and Owsiak's empirical analyses suffer from two biases that both (1) raise concerns about the causal relationships identified in the article, and (2) suggest some important scope conditions in its empirical findings. I investigate the biases and propose suggestions for legal scholarship to produce more credible results.
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak make a valuable contribution to an expanding body of scholarship that considers whether and how international courts have out-of-court “shadow effects.” The authors argue that, in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, the threat of binding international dispute settlement (IDS)—which entails high costs for states—encourages rational potential litigants to settle out of court through other peaceful and less costly IDS mechanisms. In this essay, I challenge the narrow focus of Mitchell and Owsiak's analysis, considering the diverse aims and processes of judicialized international cooperation in two key ways. First, the authors’ focus on peaceful IDS as the sole outcome of interest overlooks other important cooperation goals driving judicialization and delegation to international courts. An emphasis on out-of-court IDS, even when achieved peacefully, can actually undermine other objectives for judicialized international cooperation, including the development of international law and greater compliance with international law. Second, Mitchell and Oswiak's theoretical mechanism assumes that an international court contributes to its out-of-court influence through its case law, but this discounts how international courts can engage in a range of out-of-court, non-adjudicative activities that can affect potential litigants’ cost-benefit analyses regarding judicialized versus non-judicialized IDS. Indicating its preference for increasing its “direct effects” through adjudicating disputes, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has developed capacity-building and training programs to encourage judicialized IDS under UNCLOS and states’ litigation at the ITLOS. Overall, I highlight how there is a broad range of actors and processes underpinning international courts’ out-of-court effects, and how these actors and processes can work towards multiple, at times conflicting, aims for judicialized international cooperation.
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining under the UNCLOS Regime,” Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Andrew P. Owsiak examine the extent to which legalization and judicialization of the law of the sea has changed how states manage conflicts. They argue that legalization and judicialization have diminished maritime conflict because disputing parties are able to predict how a court would rule and, therefore, they will be more likely to bargain out-of-court to achieve more favorable outcomes. Their analysis suggests that how adjudicators perform as dispute resolution bodies is basically irrelevant. Drawing on the literature on the performance of international courts, this essay identifies numerous ways that the contribution of international courts to the resolution of disputes is contingent on key performance criteria, including legal clarification and compliance. When international courts perform at their best, judicialization enhances the impact of legalization. If performance is a contingent feature of international adjudication, then the generalizability of Mitchell and Owsiak's argument might be limited by the extent to which adjudicators achieve certain key performance criteria.