

The significance of the work is that it clearly describes and explains the great divergence between official policy and public opinion. The Austrian Monarchy was trying to preserve the European system of 1815 and its alliance with Russia. Any involvement in the uprising might easily have resulted in a general European conflagration. Besides, in 1830 the Austrian government was much more concerned with the revolutionary movement in Italy than in Poland. The peoples within the Austrian Empire felt none of the concerns of their government. To them, the Polish effort reflected their own aspirations for liberation and therefore deserved all possible sympathy and support; the so-called Spring of Nations was close at hand.

As a work of careful scholarship, based on hitherto unused source material and pointing up the divergence between government and people in Austria, Seide's monograph is a welcome addition to the literature of the November Uprising.

CHARLES MORLEY
The Ohio State University

PAMIĘTNIKI. By *Maciej Rataj*. Edited by *Jan Dębski*. Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1965. 488 pp.

POLSKIE STRONNICTWO LUDOWE PIAST, 1926–1931. By *Józef Ryszard Szaflik*. Zakład Historii Ruchu Ludowego. Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1970. 383 pp. 70 zł.

POLSKA PARTIA SOCJALISTYCZNA W LATACH 1935–1939: PROBLEMY DWUDZIESTOLECIA, 1918–1939. By *Janusz Żarnowski*. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1965. 420 pp.

RZECZYWISTOŚĆ I POLITYKA: ZE STUDIÓW NAD DZIEJAMI NAJNOWSZYMI NARODOWEJ DEMOKRACJI. By *Jerzy Janusz Terej*. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1971. 457 pp.

Of the four books under review, the one by *Maciej Rataj*, a prominent leader of the Piast wing of the Polish Peasant Party and marshal of the Sejm from 1922 to 1927, covers the earliest period and is the most fascinating to read, since his diary and memoirs give an almost day-to-day account of Polish domestic politics and foreign policy from 1919 to 1927. *Rataj* was born in 1884 into a peasant family in an East Galician village appropriately named *Chłopy* (peasants). He obtained a degree in classics at the University of *Lwów*, and as a student became associated with the founders and leaders of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), particularly with those who, after the 1913 split of the party into Right (Piast) and Left (Wyzwolenie, or Liberation) parties, led the Piast. He taught classics for a few years in *Zamość* before he was elected to the Sejm in 1919. As deputy chairman of the Sejm commission charged with drafting the Polish Constitution he played an influential role, as he did later as marshal of the Sejm. It would be no exaggeration to call him Poland's outstanding constitutionalist and parliamentarian. He devoted himself to making the Polish parliamentary system work, but the task was impossible. The opposition between Right and Left was irreconcilable, and the major parties frequently underwent internal splits. At one time (1926) over sixty different political groups were in existence.

Rataj often complained in his diary that the petty ambitions of political leaders obscured the interests of the state. He gives an interesting account of the political

situation on the eve of Piłsudski's coup d'état in May 1926. The Piast leader, Wincenty Witos, allied himself again (as in 1923) with the National Democrats, and freely voiced the opinion that a strong government was needed to rule *over* the citizens not *with* them. No wonder the Polish Left (including the Communists) feared a rightist regime and gave its support to Piłsudski. A few years later, when it was clear that the opposition parties could not agree to the type of government Piłsudski desired, Rataj played a major role in creating the Center-Left bloc and, in March 1931, in unifying the right and left wings of the Peasant Party. In the absence of Witos, who lived in exile in Czechoslovakia from 1931 to 1939, Rataj led the united Peasant Party. He was shot by the Germans in April 1940.

Intriguing glimpses of foreign policy are also found in Rataj's papers. In September 1924 the French government informed its Polish ally that it would conclude a guarantee pact with Great Britain and Belgium, and advised Poland to ally with Czechoslovakia. Rataj comments that France would have betrayed Poland if she could have done so. He thought this a dangerous omen, and the whole matter was kept secret from the public (p. 232). In November General Sikorski found it no easy task to obtain French guarantees of the existing treaties (pp. 246–47). Another interesting item is Sikorski's claim that the famous "Zinoviev letter" (which contributed to the fall of MacDonald's Labour Government) had been "cooked up" by him and passed on to MacDonald through Gregory, a conservative official of the Foreign Office who hoped to obtain the post of British minister plenipotentiary in Warsaw. According to Sikorski, Polish military intelligence used Comintern material to prepare a letter with Zinoviev's signature forged on it (p. 247). Sikorski's claim may be true.

Sikorski is pictured as a vain and ambitious politician, though undoubtedly an able one. Witos is presented, at least in May 1926, as arrogant and reckless. Piłsudski is described as uncompromising and arrogant, often using coarse language when referring to parliament and politicians. Rataj himself emerges as an objective, balanced, fair-minded parliamentarian. Other accounts of him, such as works on the Piast party, corroborate this picture. It is a great pity that none of his papers survived for the period after 1927.

Szaflik's book is a detailed and balanced account of the Piast party in the period 1926–31—from Piłsudski's coup to the unification of the peasant parties. A good introductory chapter covers the years 1918–26. The author does not praise Witos's alliance with the landowners and the National Democrats in 1923, but explains it as motivated by Witos's view of the supremacy of state interests over those of the peasants. He says that Witos and his collaborators believed that peasant interests would be best served by Piast's participation in government. However, Witos's agreement to give up land reform in favor of moderate land distribution alienated Piast even more deeply from the left-wing peasant party, Wyzwolenie. Szaflik also stresses the conservatism of Witos and his followers. They could not support expropriation, because they believed in the sacredness of private property. There seems to be a contradiction between the author's claim that the Piast party represented the interests of the well-to-do peasants and his admission that its stronghold was in the Kraków voivodship, where small and dwarf farms predominated. However, this contradiction may be more apparent than real. Most of the Polish peasants, poor or well-to-do, were conservative. The Piast party was not really weakened until the secession of Jakub Bojko, who founded a progovernment peasant party in 1927, promising that Piłsudski would carry out land reform. It

should be noted that at that time Piłsudski still enjoyed great popularity and actually represented stabilization. This is probably the major reason for Bojko's success.

In late 1925 and early 1926 the Piast party had about seventy thousand members, making it the second largest party in Poland after the National Democrats. It is interesting that the majority of Piast deputies voted for Piłsudski as president in 1926 and, when he refused the position, for his candidate Ignacy Mościcki. In fact, there were many admirers of Piłsudski in the Piast leadership. The party did not recover from Bojko's secession until March 1931, when the united Peasant Party (SL) emerged. By that time, however, only a united opposition could have overthrown the "Sanacja" government (nicknamed "Sanacja" because of the government's attempts to "heal" the nation politically). This was impossible because of the abyss between the Center-Left bloc, on the one hand, and the right-wing parties, led by the National Democrats, on the other.

From Zarnowski's study of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in the years 1935–39 we learn as much about the Polish Communists as about the Socialists. This information, owing to the destruction of most PPS archives and survival of Communist ones, makes the book especially interesting. As in other European countries, the Polish Socialists suspected the Communists of planning to take over leadership if a united front was created. While avoiding such a front, however, both parties often managed spontaneous cooperation at May Day rallies and other occasions. The Polish Communists, like the Socialists, saw a right-wing National Democratic government as a greater evil than the "Sanacja" regime of Piłsudski and his successors. Part of the PPS leadership desired some accommodation with the "Sanacja," and Piłsudski had many admirers in the leadership of what had once been his own party. A similar trend toward cooperation with "Sanacja" existed within the leadership of the Piast and National Democratic parties. In view of this, and the irreconcilable attitudes of Right and Left to each other, it is not surprising that Piłsudski and his followers retained control.

Terej gives a detailed account of the largest Polish political movement at the outbreak of the Second World War (two hundred thousand members in 1939). He demonstrates that the National Democrats were more a movement than a party, since they included the "old men" who favored parliamentary government, the "young men" who before 1939 aimed at alliance with "Sanacja" and during the war with General Sikorski's government (in London), and the radicals who disagreed with both and stood for an authoritarian type of National Democratic government. There was also a fascist faction, the "Falanga," led by Bolesław Piasecki, which even in 1941 had a program of building a Polish empire "from sea to sea."

Terej's book will undoubtedly be a quarry for scholars interested in National Democratic politics in the years 1939–45. It is, however, difficult to read, because it is an attempt to cover all the twists and turns, splits and reunions. In this respect, Terej's short popular history of the National Democrats is more readable (*Idee, mity realia: Szkice do Dziejów Narodowej Demokracji*, Warsaw, 1971). The picture that emerges of National Democratic politics during the war is a disturbing one. The strongest faction, led by Tadeusz Bielecki, wanted to share power with Sikorski in order to dominate his government—in both London and Poland. The overall impression gained from Terej's book is that the National Democrats continued their prewar factions and aims at a time when the Polish nation struggled for survival. The year 1945 was, in fact, the epilogue for political parties formed on Polish ter-

ritories before 1918. One may wonder whether under different conditions the National Democrats would have emerged as a strong party after World War II. The reviewer is more than doubtful.

ANNA M. CIENCIALA
University of Kansas

DYPLOMACJA NIEMIECKA, 1919–1945: ZARYS INFORMACYJNY. By *Henryk Batowski*. Katowice: Śląski Instytut Naukowy, 1971. 103 pp.

NIEMIECKA DZIAŁALNOŚĆ WYWIADOWCZA NA POMORZU, 1920–1933. By *Henryk Kópczyk*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1970. 295 pp.

Both monographs deal with the international behavior of Germany and that nation's attempts and failure to regain after World War I its former political power, at the expense of its neighbors. Batowski's study is an analysis of why détente could not have worked in Europe, owing to the "aims and attitudes" of the post-Versailles German governmental power structure. His thesis, based on East European and Western sources, is that the Junker, Bismarckian tradition played a dominant role in state craft and diplomacy, even though officially, before 1933, the government was republican. Mercifully free of the heavy and often dubious interpretations that characterize some recent Soviet and East European works on this crucial period, the book stresses that the traditional German military and diplomatic hostility and prejudice toward Poland was momentarily overturned because of the Hitler-Piłsudski nonaggression declaration. Batowski explains that this important diplomatic reversal reflected Hitler's fear of war waged against him by France and Poland (p. 38). Unfortunately there is yet to be written a fully documented history of German-Polish relations during the years 1932–33 focusing on the question of a "preventive war." Warsaw, after a short period of indecision, welcomed the change in the German government. The French attitude during this period can only be described as resigned quiescence.

Batowski's work sheds no special light on the role of the Soviet Union from August 1939 to June 1941, and that country's impact on German policy. The diplomatic importance of the Hitler-Stalin Pact is almost ignored by the author. Stalin is mentioned only once. Batowski stresses that the *Auswärtige Amt* tractably carried out Nazi policy, which was an adaption of the traditional Bismarckian policy directed toward Russia; but at the same time Germany failed to understand that the Soviet Union had indeed a "new" kind of foreign policy (p. 64). Nevertheless, we have here a most useful and scholarly contribution to the story of German diplomacy, especially welcome because of its East Central European origins and its judgment of what the period ending tragically for Germany in 1945 was all about.

When one considers Danzig and the Polish Corridor as the main bone of contention between Germany and Poland during the period between the two world wars, it is difficult to understand why so little scholarly research has been initiated on the role of Danzig as a Trojan horse for German policy aimed at Poland. Kópczyk's book specifically covers German intelligence and infiltration of Poland during the period 1920–33, which began with the restoration of Pomerania as a new Polish state and ended with the expiration of the Weimar Republic, culminating on January 26, 1934, when Hitler signed a Polish-German nonaggression treaty.