

The use of exclusively English language sources (and mainly secondary) has resulted in basic misconceptions. Throughout the book there are shorthand references to the “EU’s AA policy,” but the Association Agreement itself—despite being a pivot of EU policy—does not appear to have been examined and is not actually referenced in the book. This is no small omission for a study that seeks to explore, amongst other issues, the trade triad. Contrary to the argument of the zero-sum policy “imposed on Ukraine” to drag it away from Russia, Ukraine demanded a new Agreement from a reluctant EU and the latter was made fully compatible with Ukraine’s free trade agreements with Russia. The nominally technical details of trade agreements—which are dismissed in the neorealist framework—are pivotal to understanding the strategies and goals of the EU and Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine.

This book is very ambitious and wide-ranging in its scope, but its main strength is that it offers a broad survey of EU and Russian policies toward Ukraine. It will appeal to International Relations scholars looking for an introductory text on the “Ukrainian crisis.” For those familiar with the EU’s foreign policy and with Russia and/or Ukraine, this book is unlikely to satisfy the demand for a more nuanced, granulated analysis.

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Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. By Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton. Abingdon, Oxon, Eng.: Routledge

for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017. 212 pp. Notes. Chronology. Glossary. Index. Figures. Maps. \$21.95, paper.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.160

This slim volume dispels some myths about the crisis in Ukraine that followed the Euromaidan revolution. Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton challenge several common explanations of the crisis, such as those stressing Russia’s imperial ambitions, western expansionism, President Vladimir Putin’s preoccupation with his regime’s internal stability, and a regionally unbalanced security system. Instead, the authors stress the growing self-adversarial behavior of both the west and Russia, with little effort to find mutually-acceptable solutions and overcome what they call a zero-sum political game in Eurasia.

The book’s structure serves the argument well. In the first chapter, titled “Cold Peace,” Charap and Colton lay out the historical preconditions that made it difficult for Russia and the west to agree. They argue that the settlement that officially ended the Cold War was not satisfactory. While Mikhail Gorbachev advocated neutrality for east central Europe, referring to the option as Finlandization, the west embraced the idea of expanding NATO and the EU as its two best-functioning institutions. Both institutions expanded by leaving Russia on the periphery of the new Europe and offering assurances that the expansion would suit Russia’s interests by providing stability and good governance. Neither NATO nor the EU were interested in negotiations, instead presenting their decisions to Russia and others in the region as the only choices available. The Kremlin, too, assumed it would dominate in the region through the Commonwealth of Independent States and the application of various bilateral political and economic tools.

The second chapter shows how the established Cold Peace unraveled in the mid-2000s. The color revolutions of 2003–5 caught Russia by surprise and developed the perception in the Kremlin that western security agencies worked to undermine Russia’s internal stability and influence in the former Soviet region. In the meantime, NATO and the EU continued to expand and politicians like Mikheil Saakashvili of

Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine pushed for their membership in the new Europe as a way to turn their back on Russia.

These and other developments constituted the context in which the crisis in Ukraine became possible and indeed inevitable. Chapters 3 and 4 document developments preceding and following the Euromaidan revolution and propose solutions to the crisis. The authors identify Russia's and the EU's mutually-exclusive positions regarding potential membership for Ukraine in their political and economic organizations. Before 2013, Moscow was pushing President Viktor Yanukovich to enter the Russia-controlled Customs Union. Moscow then prevailed on Yanukovich not to sign the Associate Agreement with the EU, which set the stage for public protests in Ukraine. All subsequent developments, including political negotiations, elections, and the military confrontation between Kyiv and eastern Ukraine are then analyzed in terms of zero-sum competition between Russia and the west. Charap and Colton argue for the importance of entering open-ended negotiations involving Russia, the west, and Ukraine over the stability of east central Europe and Eurasia. Such negotiations never really took place since the Cold War's end. A new institutional arrangement should be based on economic modernization, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and military neutrality of the states in-between.

It would not be possible to squeeze into this short book all the relevant developments regarding the crisis in Ukraine. Some important omissions include the Odessa massacre on May 2, 2014, discussion of the strategy and activities of eastern fighters, as well as those of neo-Nazi divisions sponsored by Igor Kolomoisky. Analytically, the biggest omission is the role of common values and Russian-Ukrainian memories suppressed by those whom Charap and Colton misleadingly call "pro-Western nationalists" such as Saakashvili and Yushchenko. In reality, these ethnonationalists were pro-western only rhetorically, banking on the liberal west's support against Russia but aiming to eventually purge their lands of Russian culture and its bearers. Charap and Colton view ethnonationalism as a problem, but don't discuss its constituting role in forming Ukraine's new identity and relations with the authorities in Kyiv.

Overall, however, this is a balanced and very readable book that also contains helpful maps and chronology. Given these qualities, as well as the book's scope and skilled review of various economic and security issues in Eurasia, the volume would serve as an ideal text for graduate and upper division undergraduate courses on international politics of central and eastern Europe and Eurasia.

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Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences. Ed. Leandrit I. Mehmeti and Branislav Radeljic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2016. xxiii, 317 pp. Notes. Glossary. Index. Figures. Tables. Maps. \$45.00, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.161

The newly-created Republic of Kosovo has had a tortured history, having suffered from geographic isolation, economic underdevelopment, and political repression. A major source of instability has been the conflict between the Albanian-speaking majority and a Serb minority, as well as domination by the neighboring Republic of Serbia. These festering problems culminated in an extended guerrilla war during the 1990s, which ended when the United States and its NATO allies intervened on the side of the ethnic Albanians against Serbia, leading to Kosovo's *de facto* independence in 1999 and then its official independence as a new state in 2008.