There can be no doubt, that if power is granted to a body of men, called representatives, they, like any other men, will use their power, not for the advantage of the community, but for their own advantage, if they can.
James MillEach official is evidently more active within the body to which he belongs than each citizen within that to which he belongs. The government's actions are accordingly influenced by the private wills of its members much more than the sovereign's [citizenry's] by those of its members – if only because the official is almost always individually responsible for any specific function of sovereignty. (Italics in original)
Jean-Jacques RousseauThe preceding chapters have focused upon the demand side of public choice. The citizen voter's preferences determine outcomes in the public sector. Government, like the market in a pure exchange economy, is viewed simply as an institution for aggregating or balancing individual demands for public policies. Those in government, the candidates and representatives, have been depicted as single-mindedly seeking to be elected. To do so they must please voters, so that those in government are merely pawns of those outside in a competitive political system. Only in the rent-seeking literature just reviewed does one begin to obtain a glimpse of another side of government. Politicians may not live by votes alone. They, too, may seek wealth and leisure. Their preferences may impinge on the outcomes of the public sector.
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