GENERAL Murray's report to the War Office implied a greater success on 25 March than had actually occurred. For some days the War Office believed him, but, prodded by the War Cabinet, Robertson eventually asked for full details, and on 1 April Murray replied with a long telegram which gave fuller information. It was written in a way which suggested that his original claim for a victory was justified; yet a close reading showed clearly that his forces had attacked Gaza and been repulsed. His estimate of Turkish casualties had climbed to over 8,000, and he understated his own losses.

This was a mistake. He might fool Robertson, who tended to take such reports as truth, but the War Cabinet included some of the sharpest political minds in Britain, men who were well used to seeing through the spin. Robertson replied to Murray on 2 April without censuring him, but taking it for granted that Murray was now able to advance to capture Jerusalem. Robertson stated that he had intelligence that the Turks had no more than 30,000 rifles in Palestine, pointed out that the Canal was now in no real danger, and promised supplies and, perhaps, reinforcements.

Murray's report emphasized the ability of the mounted troops to tackle any opposition in open country, but he also noted that when the Turks were encountered in prepared positions – in other words, in trenches and other fortifications – they were ‘very tenacious’. Elaborating from that, it could be assumed that any attack on Gaza city would have been extremely difficult and costly, and would have taken a considerable time. This was a disguised excuse for failure, since his forces clearly did not have much time and the original plan called for the city to be seized by a coup de main. Both sides, in fact, took due note of these points. Murray pointed to ‘the fog and waterless nature of the country’ as the ultimate reasons for the failure of the attack, but these were only partial explanations. Nobody was seriously inconvenienced by the fog, no matter what they said afterwards, and the lack of water was fully understood beforehand: it was the basic reason for the attempt to seize the city swiftly.